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and regime support in India: the impact of the crisis", a paper presented at
the Duke-UNCG Conference on Parliaments, Policy, and Regime Support,
Duke University, December 2-5, 1982.
19. A veteran parliamentarian, Madhu Limaye, has charged that the attitude of
the then leadership of the ruling party has alternated between two sentiments.
of the former prime minister's (Mrs. Indira Gandhi) approach to parliament.
"When the opposition is strong as in 1967-72, she is haunted and when it is
weak, she has total contempt for parliament. While Nehru had greater respect
for parliament and for the opposition, Mrs. Gandhi is paranoid." As quoted
by P. P. Balachandran, "Indian parliament: the twilight era," in Probe India,
December 1981, p. 10.
20. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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The Polish parliament and labor
legislation during Solidarityl
DA VID S. MASON

Parliaments in communist party states are usually treated in Western
literature as "rubber stamp" institutions that simply approve policies
made elsewhere. As such, these bodies do not perform functions of
interest articulation, representation, or policy-making that are characteristic of many Western legislatures. This assessment, however,
oversimplifies the issue and obscures important differences in the
legislatures of the various communist states. It also diverts attention from
the dynamics of legislative authority in these states, and the extent to
which the relationship between legislatures and other political institutions
reflects broader aspects of the political system.
Even before 1980, the Polish parliament (Sejm) was, along with that of
Yugoslavia, the most active and autonomous of East European legislatures. During the Solidarity era the role'of the Sejm was enhanced even
further. The period from August 1980 to December 1981 was the most
open and fluid era in Poland's postwar history, and, during this time,
virtually every political institution was reformed or revitalized. The Sejm
was one of the few institutions that did not undergo substantial change in
composition, since there were no new elec~ions during this period, but it
did take on a more active and, at times, clbstreperous role.
This chapter examines the evolution of the Sejm from 1980 to 1983,
focusing on the role of the Sejm in the critical area of labor legislation.
During 1980 and 1981, a new trade union bill and legislation on enterprise
self-management were two of the major issues that confronted both the
regime and Solidarity. The Sejm came to play an important role in the
evolution of these two pieces of legislation. The bill on self-management
was enacted during this period, in October 1981, after considerable work
179
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by the Sejm. The new trade union legislation was not finally enacted until
October 1982, almost a year into martial law. This was a very different
environment, and the Sejm's role was much reduced over 1981. All of this
will lead to a consideration of the role of the Sejm in the Polish political
system, and a comparison of this role to those in other countries, East and
West.

Much of the Western literature on communist parliaments has simply
dismissed them as "rubber stamps" that have no real legislative or
representational functions, but rather serve only ceremonial or propagandistic functions. Only in the last decade have some area specialists
gone beyond this formulation, sometimes arguing that legislatures in some
communist countries are gaining in importance, and perhaps becoming
4
more functional as articulators of populat interests or demands. In the
first book-length work on the role of communist legislatures, Dan Nelson
(1982: 8) suggests that while such legislatures may not provide
representation in the Western sense of either" trustee" or "delegate,"
they may perform "a mediating function, connecting the citizenry to
government." In the same volume, Stephen White identifies four main
roles of communist legislatures: (1) to help legitimize the government;
(2) to provide a means of societal integration and nation-building; (3) to play
a" not negligible" role in the policy-making process (through refining and
amending legislation); and (4) to monitor and supervise the work of
government bodies. The first function is performed by all communist
legislatures. The second pertains primarily to multinational states such as
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The third and fourth are performed to
various degrees depending on the state. The Yugoslav legislature has been
the most active in policy-making; the Polish in supervision.
Even in the policy-making category, the Polish Sejm has played a role.
As Simon and Olson (1980:212) have pointed out, the Sejm has "some
standing" in the political system; its activity is particularly evident in the
parliamentary committees, which have often revised, delayed, or amended
legislation submitted to it by executive offices of the government. The role
of the Sejm may change with changing political circumstances and, as
such, may act as a kind of" barometer" of political life in Poland. In fact,
this aspect of the role of the Sejm is recognized by Polish scholars as well,
as indicated in the following passage:

THE ROLE OF THE SEJM IN POLAND

The Sejm is a unicameral legislative body conslstmg of 460 deputies
elected in direct elections every three to five years. Deputies of the ruling
Polish United Workers' Party (the communist party, PUWP) have always
constituted a majority of the assembly, typically holding about 55 percent
of the seats. The remaining seats are divided among the PUWP's
"satellite" parties, the United Peasant Party (113 seats in the 1980
elections) and the Democratic Party (37 seats), and some non-party
members (49 in 1980; 74 in the 1985 elections). This last group includes
representatives of three Catholic groups,2 none of which, however, are
supported or recognized by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
All of the Sejm deputies have permanent jobs elsewhere, and Sejm
sessions are one to three-day affairs every month or two. Between
parliamentary sessions, legislative authority is exercised by the Council of
State, which is elected by the Sejm. Most legislation is introduced by the
Council of State or by the Council of Ministers, the executive organ of the
government, although since 1971 Sejm committees may also initiate
legislation. All legislation passes through at least one of the twenty-five
permanent committees, including the important Committee on Legislation
(Komisja Prac Ustawodawczych), which reviews the technical and legal
aspects of the bills. In recent years especially, two or more of the relevant
committees will often constitute joint subcommittees to deliberate on a
bill. Committees sometimes substantially revise legislation before it is
presented to the plenary session for approval. 3
After the introduction of martial law in December 1981, the regime
constituted two "advisory" bodies that were attached to the Sejm,
p~esumably in an effort to add legitimacy and credibility to that body. The
STcio-Economic Council (Rada Spoleczno-Gospodarcza) consists of
ninety-five representatives of large enterprises and other official organizations. The Sejm Advisory Council (Zespol Doradcow Sejmowych)
c(j)J1sists of academic experts and other specialists. Both are empowered to
offer advice and formal opinions on legislation and other matters before
the Sejm.
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The activity of the Sejm ... is a kind of barome~er of the general climate and pulse
of political life. Just as an intensification of its 4ctivity and an expansion of its role
in the system is an expression of accelerated social change and democratic
development, so too a waning of the Sejm's activity and a diminution of its
authority is a symptom of stagnation and setbacks in the development of social
and political relations. (Jarosz, 1976: cited in Terry, 1981: 27)

Thus the role and activity of the Sejm has varied over time, and has been
particularly synchronous with the cycle of political unrest in Poland. After
the political upheavals (and leadership changes) of both 1956 and 1970,
the role of the Sejm increased briefly, only to fall back to relative inactivity
in subsequent years (Terry, 1981) .
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The potential for Sejm autonomy has always been circumscribed,
however, by the lack of competitive elections, the limited number of
plenary sessions (generally once a month for one day) and "the leading
role of the Party." 'The Polish United Workers' Party (the communist
party of Poland) holds about 55 percent of the seats of the Sejm and over
66 percent of the committee chairmanships, and its leading role insures
that it exercises substantial control over the other seats as well. Almost all
legislation is initiated either in government ministries and the Council of
Ministers, both party controlled, or in the party itself. 5 During the 1970s,
the regime allowed "informal consultations" between the initiating
ministries and the corresponding Sejm committees, indicating the limited
consultative role that the legislature played in those years (Terry, 1981).
On the other hand, the Sejm had some characteristics that often allowed
it at least a limited role. The existence of the two satellite parties (the
Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party) and three Catholic
political associations in the Sejm "creates an arena in which there is
considerable potential for interest articulation and aggregation, as well as
political communication" (Simon and Olson, 1980: 213). Furthermore,
while the plenary sessions themselves are mostly devoid of debate and
policy-making, there is some such activity in the Sejm committees.
Depending on the political character of a bill, party discipline (and
therefore PUWP control) is not always exerted within Sejm committees; it
is sometimes withheld until bills are ready for the plenary sessions. Thus,
committee debates often cut across party lines (Olson and Simon, 1982).
The number of committees has grown over the years, and the expertise of
Sejm committee members had increased, adding to the potential role of
the committees. Thus, even before 1980, Sejm committees occasionally
made substantive changes to bills presented by the government.
In the most intensive recent study (in English) of the Sejm, Olson and
Simon (1982) identify three factors indicating a growing capacity for
action and independence by the Sejm: a qualitative improvement, in terms
of training and education, of the membership of the Sejm; increased
activity by the committees; and increased supervision and control over
governmental administration. The result, according to the authors, is that
th6 Sejm was moving from what Michael Mezey (1979) calls a "minimal
parliament," which accepts government proposals quickly and without
reServations, to a "marginal" one, which can delay and modify such
pr0posals. Indeed, as we have seen, the Sejm did take on such
characteristics even before 1980.
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The Sejm during Solidarity
From the very beginning of the Solidarity period, the Sejm experienced a
renaissance, as did virtually every other institution in Poland. 6 Even in the
first plenary session of the Sejm after the Gdansk Agreements, on
September 5, deputies engaged in a lively and open debate on the
problems facing the country. At first, criticism was focused largely on the
past (Gierek) leadership, but during 1981 deputies often voiced open
criticism of the current government as well. Such speeches were most often
delivered by the non-PUWP deputies. At an October 1981 Sejm plenary
session, for example, the non-party deputy Romuald Bukowski criticized
the authorities for" exercising power neither by the will of the people nor
on its behalf but rather through the implementation of various principles
that were created in the past" (Radio Free Europe Research [hereafter
RFER], November 11, 1981). This was surprisingly strong ianguage, but
was not unique for Sejm speeches during 1981. In its role as critic and
sounding board for governmental policies, the Sejm came to resemble
some Western parliaments. The party leadership apparently encouraged
this autonomy, within limits. In 1981, for example, the PUWP relaxed
party discipline in the Sejm on votes for personnel appointments (e.g., to
ministries). This contributed to the appearance, at least, of autonomy and
independence of the legislature. 7
Statistical data also demonstrate the increased activity of the Sejm
during this period. Several new committees were created in 1981
(continuing a longer-term trend), including permanent committees on
Complaints and Suggestions and on Workyrs' Self-Management, and an
extraordinary committee established to monitor fulfillment of the 1980
Agreements signed between the workers and the government. The
frequency of committee meetings increased 'from about ten per committee
per year before 1980 to eighteen per committee per year in 1980-82 (a
trend which continued after 1982). Sejm d~puties became more active on
the floor of the legislature as well, as interpellations of government
officials by deputies jumped from 26 in 1980 to 223 in 1981. 8 This activity
frequently took up the bulk of the time of the Sejm's sessions. Popular
expectations of the Sejm were shown in the number of letters and
complaints sent to the Sejm, which increased from 7,786 in the last ten
months of 1980 to 19,827 in 1981 9 (Niektore Dane Statystyczne, 1985).
By the end of 1981, the Sejm was even able to resist pressure by the
regime to pass an Extraordinary Powers Bill which, in restrospect, was an
attempt to provide legal sanction for the eventual declaration of martial
law. When the PUWP Central Committee ordered its Sejm deputies to
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Army. In the official poll, some 82 percent expressed trust in the Sejm; in
the Solidarity poll, 50 percent. l l These figures were much higher than for
any other political institution, even for "the government" broadly
considered. In another poll in the summer of 1981 on how well various
institutions had done in helping alleviate the crisis, the Sejm ranked
behind only the Church and Solidarity, receiving a positive assessment
from half the sample (Spoleczeristwo polskie).
The relative popularity and apparent viability of the Sejm led many
Poles to focus on that institution as an object for political reform. In the
summer of 1981, there was some discussion of a possible second chamber
of the Sejm, to consist of deputies more genuinely representative of
society. In Solidarity's Program, adopted at the union's October Congress,
part of the program for establishing a "self-governing republic" consisted
of the restoration of the authority of the Sejm and the amending of
election rules to allow all political parties and organizations to nominate
candidates. After free elections, the Sejm should then be "the supreme
power in the state. " By the end of 1981, over 70 percent of the population
favored calling new elections to the Sejm and peoples' councils as one
means of coping with the crisis (Polacy '81; cited in Mason, 1985: 174).

push for such a bill, the non-PUWP deputies balked. They received
encouragement from both the Church, when Primate Glemp urged
deputies not to vote for the bill, and from Solidarity, when its Presidium
threatened a general strike if the bill were passed. All of this was an
extraordinary display of independence by the Sejm and, as T. G. Ash
(1983: 242) observes, "another, important facet of the 'collapse of the
system. '" The laruzelski regime was compelled to declare martial law
without the bill, and did not achieve legal sanction of the act until after the
fact. 10
More importantly, the Polish parliament involved itself deeply in some
of the many and important reform bills of the Solidarity era. The Sejm did
not ever initiate these bills, but Sejm committees often played a major role
in mediating between different groups with contending versions of reform
legislation. The Sejm played a crucial role, for example, in bringing to
fruition a revision of the Teachers' Charter, which addressed such issues
as teachers' salaries and workloads, pedagogical techniques, and, probably
most importantly, curricular content. A draft charter was initially put
together by the Polish Teachers' Association (ZNP) , but two more
versions emerged from the government's Council of Ministers and then
from the Teachers' Solidarity. By May 1981, "an acute impasse had
appeared" (Trybuna Ludu, October 26, 1981) and the Sejm Committee on
Education and Upbringing was brought in to mediate. All during the
summer and fall, the committee arranged conferences with experts,
teachers, representatives of the two unions and the Council of Ministers,
and even sent deputies to the provinces for "fact-finding." As the
chairman of the Sejm Committee wrote in October, "it is one of the
committee's roles to reconcile positions, to try for a common consensus in
proposing solutions, and in par~icularly difficult cases, to propose
compromise solutions" (Glos Nauczycielski, October 25, 1981). A
compromise version was finally achieved in early December and approved,
with only minor revisions, by the full Sejm in early 1982 (after the
declaration of martial law). The Sejm, and particularly Sejm committees,
played a similar role in numerous other sensitive and difficult legislative
issues.

THE SEJM AND LABOR ISSU,ES IN

Public opinion and the Sejm
Dhring 1981, the Sejm was the most popular official political institution in
P<l>land, perhaps because of the kind of open debate and autonomous
a6tivity described above. In polls on confidence in fourteen institutions,
conducted in May by the government and in September by Solidarity, the
Sejm ranked fourth, behind Solidarity, the Catholic Church, and the
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A major issue that the Sejm, and indeed the country, had to face in 1981
was the new legislation on trade unions and on self-management. A new
trade union bill became imperative from the very beginning, with the
formation of the Independent Self-Government Trade Union, Solidarity.
Legislation confirming the legality of the l;teW situation was high on the
agenda of Solidarity during the first half of ~ 981. Such legislation acquired
urgency, from the regime's point of view as well, after some twenty of the
old "branch" unions had withdrawn from the umbrella organization, the
Central Council of Trade Unions, forcing the dissolution of the CCTU at
the end of 1980. During the second half o(the year, the major demand of
Solidarity, and the most divisive issue' between the union and the
government, concerned the new legislation governing enterprise selfmanagement.
As with the legislation on the Teachers' Charter, the Sejm was not
involved in the early stages of either of these labor issues, but entered only
later in a mediating role. In this case, as in others, the Sejm was ignored
in the early stages. The legislature seemed to be caught in the middle; it
was apparently viewed as potentially too independent by the authorities,
and as potentially too compliant by the workers. The pattern with the new
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trade union legislation was typical: it began with the regime's appointment
of a commission to revise the labor union laws.
In the Gdansk Agreements, in the first point allowing the creation of
independent trade unions, the government agreed to pursue a new trade
unions' bill. The same day as the Agreements, Party leader Edward Gierek
appointed a commission to develop such a bill, attached to the Central
Council of Trade Unions. The composition of this commission was widely
criticized, leading Gierek's successor, Stanislaw Kania, to replace it in late
September with a more representative group. This one consisted of
seventeen lawyers and legal experts, twelve Solidarity representatives
(including Lech Wal{~sa), and five from the official unions. It was presided
over by Sylwester Zawadzki, Chairman of the Sejm Legislative Committee
(Sabat, 1981).
After seven months of work, the commission submitted a draft text of
the law to the Council of State. Reflecting most of the demands of the
workers, the document recognized both the right to strike and the
principle of organizational pluralism. The Council of State, "taking note
of the position of the Government Presidium" (which had reservations),
forwarded it on to the Sejm at the end of May. There the two relevant
committees (on Labor and Social Affairs and on Legislation) established
a subcommittee to continue work on the legislation. As with the similar
subcommittee formed to work on the Teachers' Charter, representatives
of labor unions (including Wah~sa) frequently participated in the
subcommittee's deliberations. There were continued disagreements between the government and Solidarity on some key issues, and even though
the government had promised to have the bill by the end of the year, the
debates continued right up until December 13. At the fateful and final
meeting of Solidarity's national leadership in Radom on December 3,
Solidarity demanded that the Sejm be presented with the Trade Union bill
"in the version agreed to with representatives of Solidarity" (Tygodnik
SolidarnoH:, December 11, 1981). However, progress on this bill was
interrupted with martial law, and was not resumed until February of 1982
(see below).
Self-management
T~e role of the Sejm was somewhat more evident and much more decisive
on! the self-management bill though, as with other cases, the Sejm was
involved only quite late in the process. Self-management was not one of
the issues raised during the dockyard strikes in the summer of 1980 and
did not become an element in Solidarity's program until the summer of
1981. The initiatives for enterprise self-management came not from the
i
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Solidarity leadership, but from an unofficial "Network" of selfmanagement initiatives among Solidarity activists, and from the government, whose January 1981 economic reform guidelines suggested
broadening the role of workers' self-management.
By the summer of 1981, Solidarity had officially adopted the demand
for self-management, based largely on the" Network" proposals. By then,
the government had also introduced its draft Bill on Workers' SelfManagement. There were numerous differences in the two versions, but
the most important centered on the hiring and firing of factory directors.
Solidarity wanted the workers to hire and fire the director, and the
director simply to carry out decisions of the self-management council. The
government bill provided only that the workers would be consulted on
management appointments, and that the ultimate power to hire or fire
would remain with the party (Ash 1983).
The conflict over this issue reached a high pitch during Solidarity's
national congress in September. Numerous delegates spoke out against
the government bill. In the two-week interim between the first and second
sessions of the Congress, Solidarity representatives met with the Sejm
committees working on the bill and reached a compromise (Tygodnik
Solidarnosc, October 2, 1981). Walesa managed to persuade Solidarity's
Presidium to accept the compromise bill, but the next day Party First
Secretary Kania informed the PUWP deputies to the Sejm that the
compromise was not acceptable. That evening, representatives of the nonPUWP Sejm deputies told Prime Minister J aruzelski that they would not
vote for the Party version of the bill.
Paradoxically, the regime's customary desire to achieve unanimity in
the Sejm plenary sessions gives the small non-PUWP factions a
disproportionate voice. The government in, this case could easily have won
victory without their votes. But in an effort to avoid a split vote, the
government allowed further modifications of the bill. The Sejm committees thus returned to the bill, worked intensively on it for two more
days, and finally achieved a bill close to ti}e one the Solidarity Presidium
had approved. It was passed in the Sejm ob September 25, the day before
the opening of the second session of Solidarity's Congress.
This was not the end of the matter, since deputies at the reconvened
Solidarity Congress were incensed at Walesa's perceived authoritarian
behavior in reaching the compromise, and at the nature of the compromise
itself. They passed one resolution censoring Solidarity's Presidium for its
methods, and another calling on individual enterprises to hold referenda
on whether they would abide by the compromise formula. The issue of
self-management remained a divisive one l through the end of the year.
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This issue, like others, showed the difficult position the Sejm was in. In
this case, the Sejm was too independent from the regime's point of view,
and too compliant for many Solidarity activists. Nevertheless, the ability
of the Sejm to challenge the regime, and to pressure both Solidarity and
the government to compromise, was unprecedented. As the British
journalist T. G. Ash (1983: 214) later wrote:

martial law: the legislature was not able to block legislation, or force
major changes in it, but some deputies continued to criticize the
government and its policies, and to abstain on or oppose unpopular
legislation. Indeed, the Sejm passed a record number of bills (57) in 1982,
many of them contributing to the enhanced power of the state (Rocznik
Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1981-1983). But there were critics, such as
Romuald Bukowski, the non-party deputy who had voted against the
martial law legislation, who continued to speak out on major issues. In a
July 5 (1982) Sejm speech Bukowski called for a general amnesty, lifting
of the ban on suspended organizations (of which Solidarity was one), a
restoration of civil liberties, and the lifting of martial law (RFER, July 12,
1982). The Sejm's usual practice of unanimous voting was also broken
frequently. When the Sejm passed an "anti-parasitism" bill requiring
most men to work, 22 deputies abstained and 12 opposed the bill. In an
even blunter form of protest, 9 members voted no and 55 abstained when
Stanislaw Ciosek was named Minister of Labor Affairs in March 1984.
Ciosek, as Minister without portfolio in charge of trade union affairs, had
been the government's main point of contact with Solidarity before and
after martial law.

the behavior of the Sejm was without precedent in the history of Poland since
1947. For the first time, infected with democracy after a year of revolution, the
deputies had directly and publicly rejected the communist Party whip.

Even apart from this dramatic episode, the Sejm had defined a new and
more expanded role for itself during 1981. With the Teachers' Charter, the
Bill on Trade Unions, and the Bill on Self-Management, the Sejm was able
to act as mediator in helping to achieve a compromise between different
interests and positions. This was accomplished largely through the
committees (and unofficial meetings of some of their chairmen), which
were able to meet more frequently, and with less publicity, than the
plenary sessions of the Sejm. Such meetings allowed a freer exchange of
views and, probably because of the lack of publicity, a greater Willingness
on each side to compromise. The Sejm was in a unique position to carry
out this role. In a society that distrusted almost everything official, the
Sejm managed to maintain some degree of integrity and popular
; acceptance, as an institution. On the other hand, the Sejm of 1981 had
I been elected in early 1980, before Solidarity, and therefore consisted
! largely of people acceptable to the regime. From the regime's point of
view, then, the membership of the Sejm, at least, could probably be trusted
not to go too far toward accommodating Solidarity.

New trade union legislation
After 1981, the most crucial piece of legislation facing the government, the
workers, and the Sejm was the trade unions bill. As seen above, work on this
legislation had continued through most of 1981, but key issues were still
unresolved at the end of the year. Martial law changed the situation
dramatically, and the process was practically begun anew when in
February 1982 the Council of Ministers' Committee on Trade Unions
published its "Proposals on the Trade iUnion Movement" (Rzeczpospolita, February 22, 1982). This proposal contained mostly general
considerations 'about the nature of the future trade union movement. The
trade unions should be self-governing and independent of state and
administrative agencies, but they should support socialist democracy, and
should have the right to strike only as a Jast resort, and not for political
purposes.
Initially, at least, it appeared that the 'regime had not ruled out the
possible reactivation of Solidarity, although in a more restricted form.
Discussions on the government's "Proposals" in the press and in the
Party often included this possibility as one alternative (RFER, April 26,
1982). But by the time the Sejm was charged with working out the details
of the new legislation in July, the government's parameters for change
seemed to exclude any possible role for SQlidarity .

THE SEJM UNDER MARTIAL LAW

The role of the Sejm after the declaration of martial law was, of course,
greatly reduced, but even then did not return entirely to the "rubber
stamp" role of earlier years. Partially because of Jaruzelski's inability to
win the Sejm's approval for the Extraordinary Powers Bill in late 1981,
ma;rtiallaw was invoked without formal legal sanction. Only after the fact
wa~ martial law formally established by the State Council. At the first
Sejim session under martial law, on January 25-26, the legislature
ret/'oactively accepted the martial law decree, with only six abstaining
vo~es and one opposing. All of these were from non-party or Catholic
(Polish Catholic Social Association) delegates, some of whom voiced
muted criticism of official policies on the floor of the Sejm.
This seemed to be the pattern of Sejm behavior in the first year of
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This time, unlike 1981, the Sejm had no real mediating role, in that there
was no legal alternative to the government proposal. The Sejm was meant
to use the "discussions" of the government proposals as a resource for
developing its legislation, but its task was largely restricted to working out
the details within the parameters set by the, authorities. According to the
underground leadership of Solidarity, the law that finally emerged had
little relationship to the 1981 draft, having been thoroughly revised by the
Council of State" without any negotiations or consultations with Polish
society." Of the seventy-five articles of the December 1981 draft, fifty-five
had been significantly changed (Bujak, 1983). Even the Sejm's Socioeconomic Council, set up by the martial law authorities to discuss pending
legislation, was not consulted on the bill.
According to the new statutes (Bienek, 1983), the new unions were to
be " independent of the administrative and economic organs of the state" ;
on the other hand, they were to be grounded on the principle of the social
ownership of the means of production, to recognize the constitutional
principle of the leading role of the Party, and to respect the constitutional
bases of the foreign policy of Poland (meaning Poland's alliance with the
Soviet Union). The new unions were to be organized on the" branch"
basis (rather than the regional one of Solidarity) and could be organized
only at the factory level until 1984. Until 1985, only one trade union
would be allowed in qny one enterprise.
The new unions were extremely controversial. The law that created the
new structure had also banned Solidarity, so carried negative connotations
for that reason. Furthermore, the Solidarity underground called for a
boycott of the new unions and demanded" trade union pluralism" at the
enterprise level. By the middle of 1983, the official press began to suggest
the "pluralism" could be a blind for "counterrevolutionary activity" and
by the summer of 1984, government spokesmen were rejecting the notion
of pluralism out of hand.
Despite the Solidarity boycott, enough people joined the new unions so
that by the end of 1984, there were some 5 million members. This was only
half the number that had belonged to Solidarity; but according to several
different academic surveys,12 about a third of the members of the new
uqions had also been in Solidarity. As one might expect, there was much
bitterness and division over the issue of the new unions: between members
ajd non-members and especially between Solidarity members who joined
and those who did not. Non-members overwhelmingly thought people
joined the unions for the material benefits only. Members, however, gave
a variety of reasons, including a belief (by some 21 percent) in the
possibility of defending workers' interests through the new unions

(" Lublin 83 "). Of union members 65 percent strongly support the new
unions; among non-unionists, 50 percent are not interested in them, and
another 14 percent considered themselves "opponents" of the new
structures (Zwiazkowiec, 1985).
Despite the importance and controversy associated with the new unions
(or perhaps because of it), Poland's legislature seems to have been only
marginally involved in the development of the new legislation after
martial law, or in the various modifications and emendations of the
legislation that followed in 1983 and afterwardsY The important role of
mediator that the Sejm had played in 1981 was no longer necessary in the
absence of opposing groups and opposing policies. In developing the trade
union legislation of 1982, the regime did attempt to "consult" with society
and with experts, and to elicit public comments. But these efforts were
circumscribed both by the authorities and by the tense environment of
martial law. Poland was no longer the forum for the kind of open and
free-wheeling debate that requires mediation. The general pattern for the
new trade union bill was determined by the Council of Ministers, the State
Council, and, presumably, the Politburo. The Sejm, and even the advisory
Socio-economic Council attached to it and appointed by the martial law
authorities, was excluded from the process.
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HYPOTHESES: THE SEJM AND'POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The changed nature of the political environment in Poland in the period
1980-82 allows the testing of some of Olson and Mezey's hypotheses
(chapter 1) about the nature of parliamentary activity.
I

Policy attributes
In the Polish case, it seems to be true (Hypothesis 15) that the activity of
the parliament is greater on issues which are new and controversial and
which involve diverse publics. One might add also that such activity
increases in new situations, since in this case it was the newness of the
situation that generated the controversy, the saliency, and the multiplication of publics. In normal times, the Sejm's role has been much
more limited, and is restricted to relativelY routine matters. A European
commentator only slightly overstates the case in arguing that" the entire
activity of the [East European] parliaments consists of either approving
acts and decrees of the state council, or routinely adopting the national
plan and budget" (Hazan: 38).
During 1981, many more of the issues that came to the Sejm were new
and controversial, and therefore attracted the attention and energy of the
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parliament. This was especially true of labor issues, which were central
elements in the whole process or "renewal." Of course the Sejm did
address other more routine matters as well during 1981, such as the
reorganization and renaming of a number of government ministries.
These matters, however, were more bureaucratic than political, therefore
less controversial and involved less input from the Sejm.
By 1982, the trade union and self-management issues were still
controversial, but they were no longer new, many people had turned away
from political issues, and some of the most important groups in society
were not allowed an official role in the debate. The role of the Sejm was
correspondingly reduced.
With regard to Hypothesis 16, the role of the Sejm was the greatest
during the intermediate stages oflegislative development. Neither in 1981
nor earlier did the Sejm playa major role in initiating legislation. Both the
trade union legislation and the self-management proposals originated
outside of parliament, occasionally with competing versions being
developed by the government (in the Council of Ministers) or extragovernmental groups (like Solidarity). On these two issues, as with others,
the primary role of the Sejm was a mediating role, attempting to find a
middle ground in the legislation that was acceptable to both sides. A
possible role for the Sejm in the implementation stage was truncated by
martial law, before these two acts could be effectively implemented.

discussed below, their effectiveness during 1981 was enhanced by the fact
that they are permanent and largely parallel the structure of the
government's ministries 14 (Hypothesis 13). This enabled members of the
committees to work directly with their counterparts in the relevant
government ministries, and to bring in their own experts who could, in
turn, have influence on the ministerial officials.
Indeed, the gradual development of the committee system in the Sejm
was a major factor allowing the Sejm to take advantage of its own
opportunities when the external conditions changed with the birth of
Solidarity. The gradual growth in the number of parliamentary committees over the years, the increasing sophistication of the structure and
functioning of the committee system, and the increasing relevance of
committees' jurisdictions all contributed to the Sejm's ability to act with
dispatch and efficiency in what was otherwise an unstable, even chaotic,
environment. Without the committee system, and the carelul procedures
developed to coordinate the committees, the Solidarity events could well
have produced chaos inside the Sejm and immobilized it.1 5
External influences
In the Polish case, the environment, broadly considered, is by far the most
important determinant of the role of the Sejm. Both in the past, and in
recent years, the Sejm's role has increased during periods of popular
unrest and leadership instability. To some extent, the political elite allows
greater latitude at such times in an effort to restore regime legitimacy and
social order. But, to an even greater extent, the more active role of the
Sejm in 1981 (as after the 1956 and 1970 events) was due to the more open
atmosphere that allowed the formation ofllew interest groups (Hypothesis
9), especially Solidarity. With the emergence of genuine political conflict
between Solidarity and the government' (Hypothesis 7), a forum for
compromise and mediation was required, and the Sejm was one of the
organizations that played such a role. In our rather limited case study, the
role of the Sejm was greatest on the Teachers' Charter bill, where a
functionally specialized interest group (the Polish Teachers' Association)
was involved (Hypothesis 6) and where this group disagreed with
Teachers' Solidarity (Hypothesis 8). Perhaps the role of the legislature
would have been even greater if there had been more such specialized
groups. At the time, the broad-based and heterogeneous Solidarity
claimed to speak for most groups in society, and was jealous of this role.
In many cases, the Solidarity leadership wanted to deal directly with the
appropriate government ministers or party officials, leaving the Sejm on
the sidelines.

Internal influences
Normally, the role of legislatures in communist countries is weak because
of the domination of the communist party (Hypothesis 10), the centralized
nature of the party (11), and the control of the parliamentary party by the
executive agencies of the party (12). While all of these remained true in
Poland, in all three cases the role of the Polish United Workers' Party
diminished during 1981, contributing to the enhanced role of the
legislature. In Poland, there were other parties and factions in the Sejm,
but these typically had not played an independent role. During 1981, the
"satellite" parties, the Catholic factions, and the non-party candidates all
as~umed a stronger role, occasionally even forcing the government to
compromise on issues to avoid a split vote in the legislature. Furthermore,
the PUWP itself became divided and demoralized during 1981, and this
wds reflected in its parliamentary faction as well, which did not always
blindly follow the party whip.
Most of the activity of the Polish parliament occurred within its
committees. While the reasons for this locus of activity are many, as
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of the leading role of the party, and by the continued (though weakened)
dominance of the executive agencies of both the party and the state and,
as 1981 progressed, the army.
Despite these constraints, the Sejm was involved in a major way on
major pieces of legislation, including the critical bills on self-management
and on trade unions. It was able to do this in two ways: through
mediation, and through its constitutional prerogatives for approving all
legislation. The Sejm, and particularly its committees, was able to mediate
between Solidarity and the government (and sometimes with third parties)
by virtue of its relatively autonomous and neutral position in the political
system. The committees were particularly appropriate for this mediating
role because of the informality and relative secrecy of their sessions and
their ability to meet more frequently than the plenum. The Sejm
committees were never entirely trusted by either the government or by
Solidarity, but neither were they entirely distrusted. They were able,
therefore, to play this limited mediating role.
The second factor is the constitutional requirement that the Sejm pass
all legislation. In some communist states, the parliament is often bypassed
on important policy issues, and this has been true to some extent in
Poland. But, in Poland, the Sejm has existed as an institution for over 400
years, and its formal constitutional powers have been respected de jure if
not always de facto. Thus, all the major reform bills of 1981 were sent
through the Sejm. In practice, of course, the majority position of the
Polish United Workers' Party in the parliament would have allowed easy
control of the legislative process. Somewhat paradoxically, however, as we
saw in the case of the self-management bill, the regime's desire to achieve
unanimity in the Sejm plenary sessions gave the minority factions a
disproportionate voice. When this group threatened 1;1ot to vote for the
government's self-management bill, the government allowed further
modifications of the bill. In this sense, this minority group achieved a role
similar to that of a small third party holding the swing votes in a
parliament closely divided between two larger parties.
During 1981, the Sejm seems to have moved from what Blondel (1973)
calls a "truncated" legislature with only limited influence on a limited
number of issues, to the next most active type, which he calls" inhibited. "
As he describes such legislatures (p. 139), they have" fairly considerable
influence in immediate matters but very little influence, even in the long
run, on general matters. They have some effective power in constraining
executive legislation, but even this has its limits; they have very little
power to initiate new ideas, and their initiative remains concentrated on
intermediate questions." Certainly, though, the 1981 Sejm would be at the

Hypothesis 2 also holds in the Polish case. In general, the role of the
Sejm has not been very great precisely because the "executive branch"
(including the party) is closed, centralized, and hegemonic. During 1981,
however, the governmental ministries became more "open," in their
willingness to discuss and negotiate with Solidarity and other groups; and
the party became more decentralized, as grass-roots reformism swept
through the organization and transformed its leadership. All of this was
reversed with a vengeance after December 1981, once again reducing the
Sejm's room for maneuver. For the Polish parliament, the environmental
factors loom large indeed.
Both before and after the Solidarity experience, with a more monolithic
political system, there was no need for a mediator among groups and
positions, as had been the function of the Sejm in 1981. As we have seen
before, the role of the Sejm in "normal" times is largely a passive one,
approving and sometimes revising legislation that is born and developed
elsewhere. The Sejm may be "consulted" by the government, but the role
of the Sejm is largely defined by the executive authorities of the
government and the party. During 1981, however, with the proliferation
of independent and autonomous interest groups and their interaction with
government agencies (itself a reflection of the increased openness of the
government), the Sejm was able somewhat to define its own role, and to
leap into this more pluralistic environment.
CONCLUSION

The pattern of participation and activity by the Sejm in recent years
conforms to that described in the Introduction: the Sejm is a kind of
barometer that reflects what else is happening in the society and the
political system. In times of upheaval, when the regime is forced to allow
a somewhat more open political environment, the Sejm can also develop
somewhat more autonomy. The Solidarity era was the most open in recent
Polish history, and the Sejm played its most active and important role in
the postwar period. Even so, its field for maneuver was limited by both
"internal" and" external" constraints (Blondel, 1973). Internally, the
parliament was constrained by its members, who had all been elected in
tht pre-Solidarity period. As an institution then, the Sejm was not as much
pa~t of the" renewal" that swept Polish society in 1981 as were most other
institutions, including the party, which underwent considerable turnover
from bottom to top. Party members retained a majority in the Sejm, and
it was the same Party members who were elected before Gdansk.
Externally, the Sejm was constrained both by the constitutional principle
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low end of this category, in which Blondel places both the French and the
Indian legislatures.
The Sejm, like most other institutions in Poland, became more active
and independent during 1981. Unlike Solidarity, other trade unions, and
most cultural and academic institutions, however, the growing independence of the Sejm was restrained by the party and state leadership,
and may even have been engineered by the authorities to convey the
impression of vitality and "renewal" within the government. In the
process, the Sejm did become more active, contributing to the very real
democratization that was occurring throughout Polish society. From the
regime's point of view, this began to undermine the ultimate constitutional
(and geopolitical) requirement of the leading role of the Party. With
martial law, all independent political activity was banned, most
independent institutions were abolished or restructured, and the Sejm
returned to its more passive role of a truncated legislature.

Notes

2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11

12

This chapter was written before the momentous changes in Poland in the
summer and fall of 1989, including the establishment of a second
parliamentary chamber, the Senate; the holding of parliamentary elections in
June, which were fully contested in the Senate and partially contested in the
Sejm; Solidarity's capture of virtually every seat available to it in both
chambers; the defection of the communist party's "satellite" parties to
Solidarity; and the subsequent formation of a Solidarity-led government
under Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. These changes herald the
emergence in Poland of a genuinely democratic and functional legislature, and
indeed of parliamentary democracy.
The three Catholic political associations are Pax, the Christian Social
Association and the Polish Catholic Social Union.
For further treatment of the role and functioning of the Sejm, see Simon and
Olson (1980), Terry (1981), and Hazan (1985), pp. 33-56.
For a review of the literature on communist legislatures, see Nelson (1982).
Of the 173 bills passed between October 1980 and February 1985, 150 were
initiated by the Council of State or the government, and 23 by Sejm deputies,
either in groups or through committees (Niektore Dane Statystyczne, 1985).
For the changes that affected even the Polish United Workers' Party, see
Mason (1984).
This policy on voting for appointments continued even after the imposition of
martial law.
This figure declined steadily after 1981 to 120 in 1982, 70 in 1983, and 59 in
1984.
This figure declined to about 10;000 per year after 1981.
This version of events has been challengeci by some members of the Sejm (in
discussions with the authors), who conten~ that there was no real conflict in
the Sejm on this issue. Some Solidarity supporters, on the other hand, believe
the Extraordinary Powers Bill was a smokescreen put up by a government that
had planned martial law months before.
For the full results of these surveys, by the government's OBOP and
Solidarity's OBS, see Mason (1985), p. 118. A national representative sample
in 1984 showed 60.5 percent still expressing trust in the Sejm.
For example, an unpublished pilot survey conducted in July 1983 by the
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University of Warsaw of 697 employees in the city of Lublin; and a second
unpublished national representative sample of adults conducted in the spring
of 1984.
13 Some members of the Sejm's leadership have strongly disagreed with this
point, contending that the role of the Sejm, at least in legislative matters, was
more substantial after martial law than before, and pointing to the high
number of bills passed in 1982 and 1983 as evidence of such influence and
activity.
14 As part of Gierek's efforts to strengthen the role of the Sejm in 1971,
committee jurisdictions were redrawn to better correspond to ministerial
divisions, and the ministries were instructed to consult with the relevant Sejm
committees in drafting legislation (Terry: 33-4).
15 The author is indebted to David Olson for the ideas in this paragraph.
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